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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RESORT RETAINERS and ZENITH : Case No: 20090668-CA 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Appellants/Petitioners, 
vs. 
: Labor Commission No. 2002480 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH and 
DONNA E. JONES, 
Priority 7 
Appellees/Respondents : 
JURISDICTION 
The Petition for Review by Appellants is from an Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration issued by the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission of Utah, dated 
July 21,2009, with regard to that Board's prior Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, dated April 
28, 2009. This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from workers' compensation decisions 
of the Labor Commission pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-801 (8), §§63-46b-13 
through 16, and §78A-4-103 (2008). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Donna E. Jones (hereinafter referred to as "Employee") submits that the issues stated 
by Employer as being those presented for review are not accurately stated. Rather, the issues 
are whether the Commission or the ALJ abused their discretion, not whether they erred, in 
awarding benefits in favor of Employee. Based upon the assertions referenced in Employer's 
Brief, Employee respectfully submits that the issues should properly be couched as follows: 
1. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in admitting the "late-filed" records of Dr. Hood 
at the hearing? 
2. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in refusing to leave the record open to allow 
Employer to determine if Dr. Hood had reviewed the Employer's IME? surveillance videos, 
and other Employer-biased records prior to rendering his initial opinions regarding surgery. 
3. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in referring the matter to a medical panel at the 
close of the hearing? 
4. Was any error in failure to keep the record open subsequently rendered harmless 
as a result of the ALJ subsequently re-opening the record and admitting Dr. Hood's 
subsequent letter/report to Employer's counsel dated January 30, 2004? 
5. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in admitting the initial Medical Panel Report 
when she re-opened the record and admitted Dr. Hood's subsequent letter/report to 
Employer's counsel? 
6. Did the ALJ abuse her discretion in submitting the matter for a supplemental 
Medical Panel Report after re-opening the record and allowing the admission of Dr. Hood's 
subsequent letter/report to Employer's counsel dated January 30,2004 and the initial Medical 
Panel Report? 
7. Did the Commission abuse its discretion in refusing to remand the case for 
additional hearing based upon Employers' IME from Dr. Stadler dated October 17,2008 and 
submitted for the first time with Employer's Motion for Reconsideration and Request for 
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Remand Hearing dated May 19, 2009? 
The Utah Labor Commission has been statutorily given the full power, jurisdiction 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in worker's compensation matters. As 
this Court has previously declared: 
"In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it. 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997) As such, we must uphold the 
Commission's determination . . . unless the determination exceeds the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion 
under 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA.."1 
The Court will not overturn the factual findings in a workers' compensation case, "unless 
they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence."2 A party challenging the Commission's findings must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and demonstrate that those findings are 
unsupported by substantial evidence. Upon failure to do so, the court will "accept the 
Commission's findings as conclusive."3 
Further, as to claims concerning the manner in which the hearing is handled or in 
which medical panels are utilized, the Court will affirm the Commission's decision so long 
as it falls within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. As this Court has explained: 
]A. E. Clevite v. Labor Commission, 996 P. 2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App., 2000), cert, 
den. 4 P. 3d 1289 (Utah, 2000) 
2McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n, 41 P. 3d 468, quoting from Large v. Industrial 
Comm % 758 P. 2d 954, 956 (Utah App., 1988) 
3Merriam v. Industrial Comm 'n, 812 P. 2d 447,450 (Utah App., 1991); Featherstone 
v. Industrial Comm % 877 P. 2d 1251, 1254 (Utah App, 1994) 
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"We apply an intermediate standard of review to the Commission's order 
requiring a medical panel hearing because the Legislature has explicitly 
delegated discretion to the Commission to apply the law in this area. See Utah 
Code Ann. §34-l-77(2)(3) (1994); Lander v. Industrial Coram % 894 P. 2d 
552, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Under this standard, we will affirm the 
Commission's decision so long as it falls within 'the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality.' Smith v. MityLite, 939 P. 2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citation omitted)."4 
That same standard, based upon "reasonableness and rationality," is applied in 
reviewing an agency's application of its own Rules, as with the Commission's application 
of its Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (H) with regard to the admission of Dr. Hood's initial 
"late filed" records. It is also applied as to the Commission's application of its 
Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (I) (8) with regard to the closing of the evidentiary record at the 
close of the hearing. Similarly, it is applied as to the Commission's application of its 
Administrative Rule 602-2-2 regarding the appointment of the initial Medical Panel at the 
close of the record following the hearing and the appointment of a medical panel again after 
the initial Medical Panel Report was admitted and record had been re-opened to admit Dr. 
Hood's subsequent letter/report to Employer's counsel. As to all such actions, the Court 
applies "an intermediate standard of review, deferring to an agency's interpretation as long 
as it is both reasonable and rational."5 
"Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P. 3d 982 (Utah App, 1998) 
"Barnard & Burg Group v. Labor Comm 'n, 205 UT APP. 401, 122 P. 3d 700, 703 
(Utah App, 2005), citing Westside Dixon Assocs. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 2002 UT 31, 
If 75 44 P. 3d 775 (Utah, 2002); Kent v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 860 P. 2d 984, 986 (Utah 
Ct. App, 1993) 
-4-
That same standard, based upon "reasonableness and rationality" applies with regard 
to the actions of the Commission in rejecting Employer's "Motion for Reconsideration and 
Request for Remand Hearing" dated May 19, 2009, in which Employer submitted, for the 
first time, an additional IME, this time from Warren Stadler, dated October 17, 2008 and 
which they found to be based upon the same information which had previously been 
considered by the Medical Panel Reports. 
Finally, this Court has also declared that, although an ALJ must submit a case to a 
medical panel where there are "conflicting medical opinions" under Utah Admin. Code 
R602-2-2, whether there are actually "conflicting" medical reports is a question of fact and 
the Court "must uphold the Commission's factual findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole."6 That "substantial evidence" 
standard "requires only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion,"7 and, "even if another conclusion from the evidence is 
permissible."8 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This matter is governed by the provisions of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act and 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Under §34A-2-802 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act, the Commission is given the authority to make its investigations into 
6Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm % 947 P. 2d 671, 677 (Utah, 1997) 
7WWC Holding Co. v. Public Serv. Comm% 2002 UT 23, TJ8, 44 P. 3d 714 (Utah, 
2002) 
*Supra., Note 4 at 984 
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workers compensation claims, "in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to 
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties." Further, the act authorizes the Commission 
to "receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material 
and relevant including, but not limited to . . .reports of attending or examining physicians, 
or of pathologists." 
Issues regarding the appointment of medical panels are governed by §34A-2-601, 
Utah Code Anno. (2002), which provides, in pertinent part: 
"(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case 
described in this Subsection (1) (a) to a medical panel appointed by an 
administrative law judge: 
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the 
course of employment for: 
(A) disability by accident; or 
(B) death by accident; and 
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability." 
These determinative statutes have also been supplemented through the adoption of 
Administrative Rules by the Labor Commission. 
The Labor Commission has adopted Rules with regard to Medical Panel Reports. In 
Labor Commission Administrative Rule 602-2-2, the Commission adopted the following 
"guidelines" for determining when a medical panel must be utilized by an ALJ, although it 
does not purport to restrict when a medical panel may be used by an ALJ: 
"A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or 
more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or 
disease; 
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2. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment that 
vary more than 5% of the whole person; 
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date 
which vary more than 90 days; 
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total 
disability, and/or 
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $ 10,000." 
That Rule also established the standards and procedures to be utilized with regard to the 
filing of Objections to a Medical Panel Report. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is 
a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the 
medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting 
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-
submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification."9 
The Commission has also adopted Administrative Rules regarding the conduct and 
procedures for Hearings and evidential matters. Labor Commission Administrative Rule 
602-2-1 (H) sets forth the rules with regard to the exchange of medical records by the parties 
and the creation and submission of the Medical Records Exhibit for use at Commission 
Hearings. That Rule provides, in pertinent part: 
"1 . The parties are expected to exchange medical records during the 
discovery period. 
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in 
his/her possession to the respondent for the preparation of a joint medical 
records exhibit at least twenty (20) working days prior to the scheduled 
hearing. 
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit 
containing all relevant medical records 
He * * 
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be 
delivered to the Division and the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at least ten 
(10) working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may 
9Labor Commission Administrative Rule 602-2-2 (B) 
-7-
not be admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation 
or for good cause shown . . ." 
The Labor Commission's Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (I) (8) sets forth the rules with 
regard to closing the record at the end of the hearing. It provides: 
"Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor Commission, the 
evidentiary record shall be deemed closed at the conclusion of the hearing, and 
no additional evidence will be accepted without leave of the administrative law 
judge." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns a dispute over whether the Labor Commission, following a similar 
determination by the Administrative Law Judge, under the specific facts of this case, must 
be found to have abused its discretion, that is to have overstepped "the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality" in its award of benefits to Employee. Specifically, Employer 
contends that there were numerous "errors" involved during the process which resulted in 
that award, including: (1) admitting Dr. Hood's initial records, although they were not 
provided to Employer until shortly prior to the hearing; (2) refusing to leave the record open 
to allow Employer to determine if Dr. Hood had seen Employer's IME reports, surveillance 
videos, and other medical records ; (3) referring the matter to a medical panel upon close of 
the record; (4) admitting the initial Medical Panel Report when the record was re-opened to 
admit Dr. Hood's subsequent letter/report to Employer's counsel; (5) submitting the matter 
for a supplemental Medical Panel Report after re-opening the record and allowing the 
admission of Dr. Hood's subsequent letter/report and the initial Medical Panel Report; (6) 
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refusing to remand the case for additional hearing based upon Employer's IME from Dr. 
Stadler dated October 17, 2008 and submitted for the first time with Employer's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Request for Remand Hearing, dated May 19, 2009. 
The course of the proceedings in this case, upon which Employer's allegations of error 
are based, has been a very long one. An Application for Hearing was filed on May 3, 2002 
which was heard on January 13,2004. However, the original claim for which the application 
was filed was a wage dispute. When discovery was complete, the parties agreed to increase 
the wage rate but it was apparent that a dispute over medical care was developing. Petitioner 
then filed an Amended Application for Hearing to address the new issues, including medical 
care and ongoing benefits through maximum medical improvement (MMI). At the February 
19,2003, hearing, the doctors were recommending a psychological evaluation before further 
recommendations on surgery. Judge Hann, the administrative law judge assigned to the case 
at that time, encouraged the parties to proceed with that examination and continued the 
hearing. When the psychological examination was completed, the Employer denied all 
medical care. The hearing was then eventually rescheduled for January 13, 2004. 
As a result of that ongoing process regarding Employee's claims, portions of the 
records required to support all of Employee's claims were not all available at the 
commencement of the action. Employee was not examined by Dr. Hood for purposes of a 
surgical evaluation until mid-November of 2003, shortly prior to the hearing of January 13, 
2004. No medical records from Dr. Hood regarding Employee existed prior to that 
-9-
examination and Employee had no medical records from Dr. Hood's office until they were 
obtained on January 7, 2004, only six days prior to the hearing date. 
At the hearing on January 13, 2004, Employee submitted the medical records of Dr. 
Hood recommending that she undergo back surgery for her industrial injury. Employer 
objected to the admission of that evidence, asserting it was "late filed." Employee's counsel 
made representations to the Commission as to why it was late filed and the Court admitted 
the additional records based upon those representations as to good cause. Employer then 
requested that the record be kept open to provide it with an opportunity to confront 
Employer's treating surgeon, Dr. Hood, to determine if he had considered all of Employee's 
medical records in connection with his report. That request was denied and the record was 
closed at the end of the hearing because the ALJ did not find that Employer had shown good 
cause as to why it should be left open. The record was therefore closed at the end of the 
hearing. The case was then referred to a Medical Panel because of the "conflicting" medical 
records which appeared in the record at that time.10 
On August 16, 2004, the Medical Panel issued its report.11 Employer filed an 
objection to that report and attached a copy of a new letter to Employer's Counsel from Dr. 
Hood, in which he indicated that due to further input and information he had received from 
Employer (outside the presence or knowledge of employee or her counsel) he had 
reconsidered surgery for Employee and had cancelled the surgery previously scheduled. 
10R. 35 - 43 
nR.45-54 
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The newly assigned ALJ, Lorrie Lima, rejected the Medical Panel Report on the basis 
that the letter indicated that there were no longer any "conflicting" medical reports and, based 
upon the remaining record, entered an Order denying the requested surgery.12 
Employee filed a Motion for Review to appeal that decision. The Commission 
granted the Motion and issued an Order of Remand.13 On remand, the ALJ issued an Order 
in which she determined to re-open the evidentiary record to admit Dr. Hood's new 
letter/report and admitted the initial Medical Panel Report because the referral had been made 
based upon "conflicting" medical reports. The ALJ also admitted Dr. Hood's new report, 
which was a "conflicting" medical report. The ALJ submitted the matter to the Medical 
Panel for a subsequent report rather than having a hearing on Employer's objections to the 
Medical Panel Report.14 The Panel's supplemental Medical Panel Report dated March 24, 
2006, which affirmed its prior determinations, was then admitted.15 
On July 18,2006, the ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
finding that Employee was entitled to benefits, including recommended medical care and 
temporary total disability compensation.16 Employer filed a Motion for Review with the 
2R. 161 - 167 
3R. 178 
4R. 185-186 
5R. 187-190 
6R. 194-202 
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Appeals Board of the Commission from the ALJ's Order and, on April 28,2009, the Appeals 
Board issued its Order Affirming the ALJ's Decision.17 
Employer subsequently filed a Request for Reconsideration with the Appeals Board 
of the Commission in which Employer included an IME from Dr. Warren Stadler dated 
October 17, 2008, which the Commission found to have reached a conclusion contrary to 
those reflected in the Medical Panel Reports. However, Dr. Stadler's IME was based on the 
same medical evidence which the medical panel had already reviewed. The Appeals Board 
of the Commission declared, "The Appeals Board declines to reopen the evidentiary record 
to include Resort Retailers' recent medical opinion on issues already decided."18 It, 
therefore, affirmed its previous decision in the case and denied the Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
On August 29, 2009, Employer filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of 
Appeals and this appeal proceeded. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Employee feels that a number of facts are relevant and material to the understanding 
and appropriate determination of this Appeal. Employee has hereinafter outlined those facts: 
1. At the hearing on January 13, 2004, Employer objected to the admission of the 
medical records from Dr. Hood, including his surgical consultation letter to Dr. Marlin dated 
November 19, 2003, which indicated the surgery was reasonably required by Employee as 
17R. 230 - 234 
18R. 257 - 259 
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a result of her industrial accident. Employer argued several factors as the basis for that 
objection: 
(a) Employee had failed to respond to three Interrogatories Employer's counsel had 
included in his letter to Employee's counsel dated November 12,2003, asking her to identify 
the medical evidence which Employee claimed to conflict with the reports of Dr. Moress and 
to "contest the opinion of Dr. Braun that Ms. Jones is not a good surgical candidate" and 
what further medical treatment she claimed to be required; 
(b) Employee failed to comply with the requirement of providing those records to 
Employer twenty days prior to the hearing; and 
(c) Dr. Hood's report is flawed because there is no evidence that Dr. Hood was ever 
shown the medical reports from Dr. Moress, Dr. Braun, Dr. Mooney, any of the other medical 
records of Employer, or the surveillance tape.19 
2. Employee responded at the hearing to those claims as follows: 
(a) When Employee's counsel received the letter from Mr. Dyer, she called Mr. Dyer's 
office to let him know that she was seeing Dr. Hood on November 17, 2003, so they did not 
have a report yet. After that, his letter did not cross her mind again until she received the 
Medical Records Exhibit and determined that it did not contain Dr. Hood's records. She 
then obtained copies of those records the following day and delivered copies to the 
Commission and to Mr. Dyer. 
19Tr. 10-13 
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(b) Employee's counsel acknowledged she did not submit the report twenty days prior 
to the hearing, but she did not have it at that time. She did not receive the Medical Records 
Exhibit timely from Employer ten working days prior to the hearing as required under the 
Rules, so neither party was in compliance. The only way she knew that Dr. Hood's records 
were missing was after she received the Medical Records Exhibit. When she learned they 
were missing, copies were promptly secured and delivered to counsel and the Commission. 
(c) Employee's counsel acknowledged that there was no evidence that Dr. Hood had 
been shown the Employer's surveillance video, the IME report, or any of the other 
"insurance-biased" information, as Dr. Hood was Employee's treating physician who was 
working for the injured worker, not for the insurance company20. 
3. After argument was completed, the Court ruled that the records of Dr. Hood would 
be admitted, declaring: 
(a) With regard to the failure of Employee to comply with discovery, no effort had 
been made with regard to a timely motion to compel and there was, therefore, no basis for 
exclusion of the discovery at this point. Further, Employer was on notice that Employee was 
seeking treatment with Dr. Hood and, under the Labor Commission Rules, Employer was 
responsible for collecting and obtaining all of the medical records and creating and filing the 
Medical Records Exhibit; and 
(b) With regard to the failure of Employee to provide the documents two weeks in 
advance, Employer also failed to timely submit the Medical Records Exhibit to the Employee 
20Tr. 14 
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and Employer could have timely obtained Dr. Hood's records. The Court further noted that 
this case involved different factual issues than the Basso case relied upon by Employer 
because, there, the parties had unilaterally decided to put discovery on hold without the 
permission of the judge.21 
4. Subsequently, Employer's counsel sought to call Employee's counsel to the stand, 
stating, "Well, she's testified or argued that she gave notice to me of Dr. Hood's reports. 
And I'd like to simply ask her when that happened, if she has any evidence of that having 
happened. I think that's an important fact in this case." The ALJ denied that request. 
5. Employer's counsel then indicated to the Court that he felt it would be helpful to 
the Medical Panel or the ALJ for Dr. Hood to have seen all of the medical records, 
explaining: 
"It seems to me that since I first heard of Dr. Hood's report last week that I 
should be given the opportunity to ask Dr. Hood if, upon a full review of the 
medical records, if that doesn't change his opinion. Because if it changes his 
opinion, then there's no dispute to even go to a medical record. And I think 
I should have the opportunity to ask Dr. Hood if a full review of the medical 
records changes his opinion, since I only learned of Dr. Hood's involvement 
in this case at all last week."22 
6. The Court denied that request and explained: 
"And for the record I'll note that the purpose of the medical panel before the 
Utah Labor Commission is to resolve just such disputes as are being presented 
before me today with Dr. Hood's report versus the independent medical 
evaluator. And that is the purpose of the medical panels, so they can evaluate 
21Tr. 15-17 
22Tr. 56 
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all the evidence and make a determination to assist me in rendering a 
decision."23 
7. Much of the testimony at that hearing involved extensive descriptions by Employee 
regarding her activities as shown on Employer's surveillance videos. She indicated the 
following factors of import: 
(a) that she had good days and bad days and she was generally better in the morning 
and it gets worse as the day goes on (Tr. 21); 
(b) that she is able to be active on a good day, including grocery shopping and errands 
but takes her medication even on good days (Tr. 22); 
(c) on bad days she can hardly get out of bed (Tr. 23); 
(d) when she goes shopping, she leans on the cart to kind of use it as a walker and she 
tries to put most of the items in the top of the basket in front as it hurts to lean over to pull 
things out of the basket and she asks for assistance for things which are too heavy (Tr. 24-
25); 
(e) it hurts when she gets into a car so she uses something she learned in Lamaze. She 
exhales and suddenly plops into the chair. She explained that when she moves in slow 
motion for such things, it is more painful. Getting out of a car is very painful because "I 
can't just swoop up" (Tr. 28-29); 
(f) she is cautious going down stairs because she has fallen and it is painful going up 
or down the stairs (Tr. 29); 
23Id. 
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(g) she started walking around the block in the fall of 2002, then when it started 
getting icy, she started walking around the track at the high school. Her doctor had told her 
to do that and the nurse case manager kept telling her that if she did not start walking she 
would end up in a wheel chair. She would not walk on bad days but on good days she would 
walk about 50 minutes. She would take breaks by laying down on a bench or the grass if it 
was dry enough. She would take double her ordinary medicine before going on those walks 
and it would still be painful, but she would do it anyway because she could not afford to end 
up in a wheelchair (Tr. 30-31); 
(h) the day the surveillance videos were taken, it was a good day and she would have 
taken those medications that day (Tr. 32); 
(i) the second video was an average day (Tr. 48); 
(j) the videos of her walking around the track showed her fists clenched, which is 
how she would walk, trying to focus her pain off to one side (Tr. 48); 
(k) she walks slowly because that is less painful for her than walking fast (Tr. 49); 
and 
(1) when she had a doctor's appointment with Dr. Braun, she was in more pain and 
more impaired at the appointment than she would have been for the videos because she does 
not like to drive after taking her pain medication, so she would not take any before her 
appointment. Also, the drive to Dr. Braun's office was a long drive, about an hour, and that 
made her really stiff from the drive, without her medications (Tr. 49). 
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At the conclusion of the testimony and argument by counsel, the evidence was closed 
and the matter was subsequently submitted for a Medical Panel Report. 
8. On October 13,2004, the panel submitted its Medical Panel Report. In that Report, 
the panel addressed the surveillance video from Employer, in light of the record including 
Employee's testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the video, indicating: 
"Review of Video: The video provided to the panel was reviewed. The 
petitioner indicated that she had been encouraged strongly by her physicians 
to get out and do as much walking, etc., as she could, and she had fortified 
herself with pain medications in order to do this. It was noted by the panel 
members that in the course of the first sequence, she gradually slowed down 
and became less vigorous in her walking activity. Likewise, in the second 
sequence, she was much slowed down and affected by her condition. It is 
noted that she had other people carrying groceries for her and that she was 
holding onto her car for support in getting back into the car."24 
The Panel Report then concluded that: (1) there was a "medically demonstrable 
causal connection" between Employee's low back condition and the industrial accident; (2) 
her condition had not yet stabilized; and (3) the surgery recommended by Dr. Hood was 
"reasonable and necessary treatment" necessitated by her industrial accident.25 
9. Employer filed an Objection to the Medical Panel Report on October 22, 2004, 
supported by a letter to Employer's Counsel from Dr. Hood, dated January 30, 2004. In that 
letter, Dr. Hood indicated that, based upon the additional documents and video provided to 
him from Employer, he would not proceed with surgery and had cancelled the surgery which 
had been scheduled on Employee for the next month. Employer claimed in its objection that 
24Tr. 50 
25Id. 
this report reflected that there were no longer any "conflicting" medical records and the 
Medical Panel Report should, therefore, not be considered.26 
10. Judge Lima, to whom the case had then been reassigned, concluded that in light 
of that new opinion of Dr. Hood, there were no "conflicting" medical opinions, thus 
obviating the need to submit the medical aspects to a panel. Therefore, she excluded the 
panel's opinion from the record and, in reliance upon Dr. Hood's new report, denied 
Employee's claim for recommended medical care and additional temporary total disability 
benefits.27 
11. Employee filed a Motion for Review of that Order28 and, upon review, the 
Commission remanded the case to Judge Lima for further action, declaring that Judge Lima 
first needed to determine whether the evidentiary record should be reopened to allow the 
admission of Dr. Hood's new opinion. The Commission further found that, if she should 
decide to reopen the record to admit Dr. Hood's new opinion, that opinion would be a 
"conflicting" medical opinion and its admission would not affect the validity of the prior 
Medical Panel Report. The Commission declared: 
"Under the facts that existed at the time Judge Hann appointed the Panel, the 
appointment was proper. The medical panel has already done its work, which 
is to exercise its independent medical judgment in evaluating the medical 
aspects of Ms. Jones' claim. It is possible that the weight of other medical 
opinion will be found more persuasive than the medical panel's opinion, but 
the Commission sees no reason why the panel's opinion should not be 
26Tr. 55 - 65 
27Tr. 161 - 170 
28Tr. 169-174 
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admitted into the evidentiary record and afforded whatever persuasive force 
it merits.29" 
12. Employer did not appeal that decision and, upon remand, Judge Lima reopened 
the evidentiary record to include the Medical Panel Report of October 13,2004, to admit Dr. 
Hood's new medical report, and allowed the parties another thirty days to provide any 
updated medical evidence of Employee's medical condition. That Order further reflected 
that she would then review the medical facts of the case in light of all the medical evidence 
and may refer the medical issues back to the medical panel for a supplemental report.30 
13. No updated medical evidence of Employee's medical condition was submitted 
by either party and Judge Lima then resubmitted the medical aspects of the case, including 
Dr. Hood's new medical report, to the medical panel for a supplemental report. In that 
submission, she specifically noted: 
"On October 13, 2004, the medical panel filed a report and concluded that 
Donna Jones was not medically stable and surgery, recommended by her 
treating physician, Dr. Robert Hood, was reasonable and necessary. However, 
Dr. Hood supplemented his original recommendation and opined that he would 
not recommend surgery on further review of Ms. Jones' medical records. This 
medical record was not included in the medical records exhibit provided to the 
medical panel for its evaluation of Ms. Jones."31 
14. The supplemental Medical Panel Report dated March 24, 2006, reaffirmed the 
Medical Panel's previous opinion that Employee was still medically unstable and that surgery 
was reasonable and necessary. It declared, in part, that radiology reports reflected injuries 
29R. 180 
30R. 183 
31R. 185-186 
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to the back and, "These are all considered significant clinical findings and would be 
considered the source of ongoing spinal pain." It further reflected that prior reports 
suggesting "caution" as to any surgical decision were based upon a mis-impression of 
"minimal objective pathology," when, in fact, the radiologic records indicate "significant 
injury." It further noted: 
"It appears as I read through the record that many people are paying a great 
deal of attention to the surveillance tapes, but I would like to call attention to 
the report of the medical panel of 16 August, 2004, p. 6, in which the review 
of the video was carried out. It appears that as panel members then we felt that 
she was impaired; in fact, the report even makes the point that the technician 
who set up the video for us involuntarily expressed his opinion that she was 
quite limited in her function in the later sequences of the video, compared to 
those at first, suggesting to us that this is limiting her activities appreciably, 
much more than one gets the impression from reading reports of other 
physicians."32 
Finally, the Report concluded: 
"Therefore, it is my opinion that surgery is reasonable and necessary as a result 
of the industrial accident that Ms. Jones sustained. The caveat that I would 
have in recommending this is that 1) she be placed on an upper extremity 
condition program; 2) she be given a time date so that she can wean herself 
from the use of the narcotics; and 3) she be assured that she will not be taken 
to surgery or have surgery scheduled and have it cancelled, which has 
happened twice in the past, but that she can be assured that her treatment will 
continue. Of great concern, of course, would be her weight, her body mass 
index is quite high, and considering the fact that her mother is built very much 
the same as she is, I feel the operating surgeon will have to set goals of 
reasonable weight loss of a few pounds and conditioning. 
The work-up for this case has been so prolonged that one would want to have 
current imaging studies done, and this may even include a provocative 
discogram to find out if the disc above her spondylolisthesis is symptomatic. 
I feel that she is a candidate for surgical correction of her two known 
32R. 189-190 
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pathologic entities, and I suggest this be done by a full-time surgeon with a 
comprehensive program for rehabilitation."33 
15. After subsequent consideration of all of the evidence, including this supplemental 
Medical Panel Report, Judge Lima found Employee to be entitled to benefits including 
medical care and temporary total disability compensation, declaring: 
"The preponderance of evidence, based on the medical panel, demonstrates 
that Petitioner sustained a significant injury as a result of her industrial 
accident based on her diagnostic studies. The medical panel further opined 
that surgery was reasonable and necessary to treat her industrial injury. The 
medical panel noted that Petitioner's psychological problems had not increased 
her physical disability. The medical panel recommended that Petitioner be 
placed on an upper extremity condition program, wean herself from narcotics 
and be assured surgery is performed as scheduled. The medical panel further 
recommended that current imaging studies be performed, including a 
provocative discogram to determine if the disc above her spondylolisthesis is 
symptomatic."34 
16. Following that determination, Employer filed a Motion for Review with the 
Appeals Board of the Commission arguing that the ALJ erred twice in referring the matter 
to a medical panel when there were no "conflicting medical reports, " and that the ALJ erred 
in adopting the supplemental Medical Panel Report of March 24, 2006, because it was not 
supported by any substantial medical evidence.35 
17. On April 28, 2009, the Appeals Board issued its Order Affirming the ALJ's 
Decision. In so doing, it found that Dr. Hood's new opinion, which was in direct 
contradiction to his previous report, "constitutes a conflicting report and that it was 
33R. 190 
34R. 200 
35R.204-219 
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reasonable and within her discretionary authority for Judge Lima to ask the panel to clarify 
its opinion in light of this new opinion." It further found: 
"Finally, Resort Retailers argues that Judge Lima's decision, which relied on 
the medical panel's opinion, was not supported by the medical evidence. The 
panel, consisting of three doctors who are experts in medical specialties 
relevant to Ms. Jones's claim, reviewed the preliminary findings of fact, the 
medical record, and both surveillance videos, and personally examined Ms. 
Jones. The panel then concluded that Ms. Jones's back condition was caused 
by the work injury, Ms. Jones had not reached medical stability, and that 
surgery was necessary to treat the injury. The Appeals Board has reviewed the 
record and finds that the independent medical panel's opinion, which was 
formed after a review of the factual information and the medical evidence, is 
well reasoned, supported by the evidence, and persuasive."36 
18. Employer then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and "Request for Remand 
Hearing" on May 19, 2009. A report from Employer's IME, Dr. Warren Stadler, dated 
October 17, 2008, was attached as an Exhibit to that Motion. In that report, Dr. Stadler did 
not find that the passage of time had changed the medical issues. Rather, the report 
contended that the original industrial injury was never the cause of her medical condition, 
issues which had been previously resolved by the Medical Panel Reports and the Court's 
prior Order.37 
19. In her Response, Employee pointed out that this Report simply attempted to re-
determine issues previously determined. She also objected to the Report based upon the 
36R. 233 
37R.235-244 
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inappropriate manner in which it was secured. Finally, she objected to the report on the 
grounds that it was not an "updated" report as indicated in that the IME had not been 
provided with much of the medical records and, particularly, had not been provided with a 
copy of the Medical Panel Reports or Employee's current treating physician. Contrary to 
Employer's contentions that no surgeon was presently recommending surgery, Employee 
explained that her current physician was recommending surgery and was simply waiting for 
conclusion of the legal matters before proceeding with surgery, including the pre-operative 
recommendations as outlined in the supplemental Medical Panel Report of March 24,2006.39 
20. On July 21, 2009, the Appeals Board issued its Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration, in which they noted the attempt by Employer to introduce a new medical 
opinion to refute the prior Medical Panel opinions as to causation and recommendation for 
surgery and to secure a new evidentiary hearing as to whether surgery was required, in light 
of the period of time which had transpired since the Medical Panel Reports. The 
Commission denied Employer's Motion, declaring: 
"The issues of medical causation, medical stability and recommended medical 
care have been adjudicated in this matter. Nevertheless, Resort Retailers 
provides a recent medical opinion from its medical consultant that reaches an 
opinion contrary to the medical panel. A review of this new opinion also 
shows that the medical consultant based his opinion on the medical evidence 
that the medical panel already had reviewed. The Appeals Board declines to 
38It should be noted that this subsequent examination was improperly obtained through 
direct contact between Employer and Employee, with no notice to Employee's counsel. It 
indicated that, if Employee failed to appear, she would be required to pay a $700.00 "no 
show" fee and her benefits could be interrupted. R. 251 
39R. 248 
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reopen the evidentiary record to include Resort Retailers' recent medical 
opinion on issues already decided."40 
The Board thereupon reaffirmed its prior decision and denied the Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
It addition to the foregoing facts which Employee believes to be relevant and material 
to this case, Employee also feels that there are portions of Employer's stated and numbered 
facts which require clarification and/or correction. The numbered paragraphs from 
Employer's Statement of Facts to which Employee refers are as follows: 
Employer's SOF No. 8. Employer did not merely provide a videotape of the 
surveillance to Employee's treating physician, Dr. Braun. Rather, without any notice or 
opportunity for Employer's counsel to be present, and without even the Employee being 
present to present her side of the matter, Employer had its case manager meet with Dr. Braun 
to present and discuss such portions of the video as Employer deemed appropriate,41 in 
violation of Employee's rights of privacy.42 These same improper procedures were utilized 
by Employer in its subsequent confrontation with Employee's treating physician, Dr. Hood, 
in an attempt to get Dr. Hood to change his opinion regarding the surgery. 
Employer's SOF No. 13. In a letter addressed directly to Employer's counsel, 
presumably in response to further written or oral contact with Dr. Braun by Employer or its 
40R. 258 
41Footnote 7 to Employer's Brief, p. 21 
42Sorensen v. Barbuto, 208 UT 8, 177 P. 3d 614 (Utah, 2008); Debry v. Goates, 2000 
UT App.58 (Utah App., 2000) 
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counsel, Dr. Braun did state, "Weighing all the factors available to me presently, I do not find 
Donna Jones to be a good surgical candidate at this time." However, that was only a part of 
Dr. Braun's statement. Immediately following the portion cited by Employer, Dr. Braun 
went on to state: 
"Certainly this should not condemn Donna Jones to non-operative treatment 
or to any specific form of treatment as she has the right to pursue additional 
surgical options. I would be happy to discuss the above with Donna and 
additionally to provide her with the names of both orthopaedic and 
neurosurgeons in this community that would be able to provide her with 
appropriate additional options and recommendations regarding her 
condition."43 
Employer's SOF No. 20. Employer inaccurately states the provisions of Labor 
Commission Rule R602-2-2 as requiring Employee "to submit all relevant medical records 
for completion of the Medical Records Exhibit at least 20 working days before the hearing." 
Rather, that Rule specifically requires only that the Employee submit the medical records in 
the Employee'spossession within that time frame. Dr. Hood was retained by Employee for 
treatment, not for purposes of providing a report to Employee's counsel. The report which 
was subsequently submitted by Dr. Hood on November 19,2003, was a surgical consultation 
report to Employee's other treating physician, Dr., Elizabeth Marlin, M.D.44 It was not 
obtained by Employee or her counsel until the day after the Medical Records Exhibit was 
belatedly delivered to Employee's Counsel on January 6, 2004, whereupon copies were 
!R.v. 3,M££,p. 64G 
U.v. 3, MRE, p. 64H 
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delivered to Employer's counsel.45 
Because there were no records in Employee's possession prior to January 7, 2004, 
Employee had no previous responsibility under the Commission Rules to secure such 
documents and forward them to the Employer. Rather, it was the Employer's sole 
responsibility to gather all of the medical records for preparation of the Medical Records 
Exhibit and to deliver them to the Commission and Employee's counsel at least ten working 
days prior to the hearing. 
Further, while Employee did fax the records to Employer's counsel on Friday, January 
9, 2004, at 3:08 p.m., that was the second time, not the first time, they were forwarded to 
counsel's office. They were initially forwarded to Employer's counsel by fax on January 7, 
2004.46 In either event, whether six days prior to the hearing or four days prior to the 
hearing, it is correct that the records were not forwarded to Employer's counsel ten working 
days prior to the hearing. 
Employer's SOF No. 21. The statement of Dr. Hood in his November 19, 2003, 
surgical consultation to Dr. Marlin was not set forth in its full context. The full report 
45Tr. 14 
46There is nothing in the Record to establish the exact date these documents were 
forwarded. Employee's counsel asserts that they were forwarded on January 7, 2004 and 
Employer contends that his fax reflects they were received on January 9, 2004. However, 
as it appears, they were both right. A review of the records and case notes of Employee 
indicates that the documents were initially forwarded to Employer's Counsel on January 7, 
2004 and that an additional set was sent by fax on Friday, January 9, 2004, at 3:08 p.m., 
when Employee's Counsel was notified by Mr. Dyer's office that afternoon that they had not 
received all of the pages transmitted with the initial fax. The difference in the dates, however, 
does not significantly affect the fact that they were "late-filed" 
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indicated that he was not just indicating a "possible" procedure but, rather, was indicating 
that significant surgery could be done to provide some, but not all, relief. He stated:: 
"She has pretty much exhausted conservative treatment and is still quite 
disabled. The only thing I would have to offer her that could possibly provide 
relief would be decompression and laminectomy at L5-S1 followed by pedicle 
screw fixation and posterolateral fusion at this level. I do not think I would 
include other levels even though she is aware that they might later deteriorate. 
This would be a significant surgery, requiring considerable rehabilitation and 
recuperation. I have told her that I could not expect this to relieve her 
incontinence and the ability of it to relieve her leg pain is uncertain. She will 
ponder this and let me know if she decides to proceed."47 
48 Employee considered the matter and scheduled surgery with Dr. Hood for February 12.. 
Employer's SOF No. 22. Employer accurately reflects that it objected to the 
admission of Dr. Hood's "late-filed report" of November 19, 2003 and that it requested, as 
an alternative, that the record be left open to allow Employer an opportunity to contact Dr. 
Hood directly with additional information which Employer felt may impact his decision. It 
is also true that Judge Hann denied that request and indicated that the matter would be sent 
to a medical panel. 
The statement, however, does not include the important additional fact that good cause 
was shown for admitting the "late filed" report in accordance with Labor Commission Rule 
602-2-2.49 It further fails to include the fact that Judge Hann similarly determined there was 
good cause to close the record following the hearing and submit the matter to a medical panel 
47R. v. 3, MRE, p. 64H 
48R. 81 
49Employee's Statement of Facts No. 3 
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for determination. 
Similarly, Employer failed to demonstrate to Judge Hann any good cause as to why 
the record should have been left open after the hearing, contrary to the normal process under 
the provisions of Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (I) (8), in order for Employer to contact 
Employee's treating doctor, Dr. Hood, with the surveillance videos and other Employer-
biased reports in an attempt to change Dr. Hood's opinion as reflected in his records which 
had been admitted as part of the Medical Records Exhibit.. 
Employer's SOF No. 23. Employer fails to note, in connection with this Statement 
of Fact, that Employer acknowledges it failed to provide Dr. Hood with the testimony 
concerning the videos, so that they could be viewed in context.51 The record fails to reflect 
what other biased input may have been provided to Dr. Hood in connection with that 
subsequent letter from Dr. Hood to Employer's Counsel. The nature and extent of such action 
is not available because Employer's contacts with plaintiffs treating surgeon, Dr. Hood, 
were undertaken outside any Subpoena or other discovery process, without the knowledge, 
presence, or involvement of Employee or her counsel, in the same manner as they had 
previously proceeded with Employer's treating physician, Dr. Braun. 
Employer's SOF No. 32. Employer's statement asserts that it is "significant" that 
Employee failed to submit any "rebuttal evidence" after the ALJ reopened the evidentiary 
records and admitted the subsequent report of Dr. Hood and the Medical Panel Report. 
50Employee's Statement of Facts Nos. 5 and 6 
5]Id 
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However, Judge Lima's Order did not direct that any such "rebuttal evidence" be submitted. 
Rather, it stated that the ALJ would "allow the parties to submit updated medical evidence 
regarding Petitioner's medical condition."52 Employee determined that nothing had 
significantly changed and that there was no need to submit any "updated medical evidence" 
regarding her condition. 
Employer's SOF No. 34. The Record does not support Employer's Statement of Fact 
that "the panel's original report hinged on Dr. Hood's original opinion that surgery was 
necessary." Rather, the Medical Panel Report, as well as the supplemental Medical Panel 
Report of March 24, 2006, was based upon the Medical panel's own determinations made 
upon the entire record and their examination of Employee, as well as the remainder of her 
medical records.53 
Neither does the Record, statutes or Rules support Employer's apparent contention 
that the Commission's award of benefits must be in error because the Record does not reflect 
what doctor will perform the approved surgery. Although Employer had previously taken 
its own actions to ensure that Dr. Hood would not perform the surgery, neither the Medical 
Panel, the ALJ, nor the Commission had the responsibility of determining what surgeon 
would perform the surgery and provide Employee with any necessary pre-conditioning 
programs. Rather, their responsibility was to determine whether such surgery was reasonable 
and appropriate, which is what they did. 
52R. 183 
"Employee's Statement of Facts Nos. 8, 13 and 14 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Labor Commission has been statutorily given the full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in workers' compensation matters. 
The Court will not overturn the factual findings in a workers' compensation case, "unless 
they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence"54 or, as this court previously has explained: 
"In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it. 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997) . . . As such, we must uphold the 
Commission's determination... unless the determination exceeds the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion 
under 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA..."55 
That same standard, based upon "reasonableness and rationality," is applied in 
reviewing an agency's application of its own Rules, as with the Commission's application 
of its Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (H) with regard to the admission of Dr. Hood's initial 
"late filed" records. It is also applied as to the Commission's application of its 
Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (I) (8) with regard to the closing of the evidentiary record at the 
close of the hearing. Similarly, it is applied as to the Commission's application of its 
Administrative Rule 602-2-2 regarding the appointment of the initial Medical Panel at the 
close of the record following the hearing and the appointment of a medical panel again after 
the initial Medical Panel Report was admitted and record had been re-opened to admit Dr. 
5A
 Supra., Note 2 
55Supra., Note 1 
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Hood's subsequent letter/report to Employer's counsel. As to all such actions the Court 
applies, "an intermediate standard of review, deferring to an agency's interpretation as long 
as it is both reasonable and rational."56 
That same standard, based upon "reasonableness and rationality" applies with regard 
to the actions of the Commission in rejecting Employer's "Motion for Reconsideration and 
Request for Remand Hearing" dated May 19, 2009, in which Employer submitted, for the 
first time, an additional IME, this time from Warren Stadler, dated October 17, 2008 and 
which they found to be based upon the same information which had previously been 
considered by the Medical Panel Reports. 
Finally, this Court has also declared that, although an ALJ must submit a case to a 
medical panel where there are "conflicting medical opinions" under Utah Admin. Code 
R602-2-2, whether there are actually "conflicting" medical reports is a question of fact and 
the Court "must uphold the Commission's factual findings if they are supported by 
substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole."57 That "substantial evidence" 
standard "requires only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion,"58 and, "even if another conclusion from the evidence is 
permissible."59 
56Supra., Note 5 
51
 Supra., Note 6 
58%?ra., Note 7 
59Supra., Note 4 at 984 
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Other than the fact that Employer disagrees with the actions of which he complains 
in his Brief, Employer has failed to demonstrate that any of those discretionary actions by the 
ALJ or the Commission were "arbitrary and capricious," "wholly without cause," "contrary 
to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or that they were outside the bounds 
of "reasonableness and rationality." 
Rather, the discretionary actions complained of were well supported in the record and 
by the Commission's Rules and by the ALJ's and/or Commission's determinations. The fact 
that the Employer or others may disagree with the actions so taken by the ALJ or the 
Commission is not sufficient for this Court to overturn such determinations. 
Since the underlying record, as a whole, fails to establish that those decisions by the 
were "arbitrary and capricious," "wholly without cause," "contrary to the one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence" or outside the bounds of "reasonableness and rationality," the 
Court should not overturn those decisions. Rather, the Court should affirm the Commission's 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2009, as well as the 
Commission's underlying Order Affimiing ALJ's Decision dated April 28, 2009. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ALJ'S ADMISSION OF DR. HOOD'S INITIAL RECORDS 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The Utah Labor Commission has been statutorily given the full power, jurisdiction 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in worker's compensation matters. 
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The Court will not overturn the factual findings in a workers' compensation case, "unless 
they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence"60 or, as this Court has previously declared: 
"In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it. 
See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997) As such, we must uphold the 
Commission's determination . . . unless the determination exceeds the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion 
under 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA.."61 
That same standard, based upon "reasonableness and rationality" is applied in 
reviewing an agency's application of its own rules as was done in connection with the 
admission of the "late-filed" records of Dr. Hood. In such cases, the Court applies, "an 
intermediate standard of review, deferring to an agency's interpretation as long as it is both 
reasonable and rational." 
A party challenging the Commission's findings must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and demonstrate that those findings are unsupported by substantial 
evidence. Upon failure to do so, the court will "accept the Commission's findings as 
conclusive."62 
Employee submits that, when all the facts surrounding the ALJ's determination to 
admit the "late filed" records of Dr. Hood are taken as a whole, those facts fail to establish 
that the ALJ's actions in that regard exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
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There is no question that Dr. Hood's records were forwarded to Employer's counsel 
shortly before the hearing, whether they were faxed on January 7 or January 9, 2004. 
However, Employee's counsel did not have any copy of Dr. Hood's records in her possession 
until January 7, 2004. The Rules of the Commission require that the Employee provide 
copies to Employer only of those medical records actually in Employee's possession twenty 
days prior to the hearing for inclusion in the Medical Records Exhibit. Dr. Hood's records, 
including his consultation report to Dr. Marlin dated November 19, 2003, were not in the 
possession of Employee twenty days prior to the hearing. 
When Employee's counsel received the letter from Employer's counsel in November 
of 2003 requesting further medical information, she notified his office that the Employee 
would be seeing Dr. Hood for surgical consultation and that he should be added to the list 
of medical providers . She did not give the matter additional thought until she belatedly 
received the Medical Records Exhibit from Employer on January 6, 2004 and saw that Dr. 
Hood's records had not been included. She then immediately secured copies of the records 
from Dr. Hood's office and delivered them to the Commission and Employer's Counsel.63 
Unfortunately, the delay in securing copies of those records was aggravated when 
Employer failed to timely deliver the Medical Records Exhibit to Employee within ten 
working days of the hearing as required under Commission Rules.64 Rather, the Medical 
Records Exhibit was not delivered until January 6,2004, barely five working days before the 
63Employee'sSOFNo.2 
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hearing. If Employee's counsel had timely received the Medical Records Exhibit, she would 
have learned of the absence of Dr. Hood's records earlier and would have been able to 
provide them sooner to Employer's counsel. 
When Employee subsequently sought to introduce those records at the hearing, 
Employer objected on the grounds that they had not been timely provided with a copy of 
those records. In response, Employee's counsel represented to the Commission the totality 
of the facts surrounding the late submission of those records.65 
After hearing the arguments of both parties, the ALJ determined to allow the 
admission of the "late filed" records of Dr. Hood. In support of that decision, she explained 
that, with regard to the argument that Employee had failed to comply with discovery, no 
effort had been made with regard to a timely motion to compel and there was, therefore, no 
basis for exclusion of the discovery at this point. Further, she noted that Employer was on 
notice that Employee was seeking treatment with Dr. Hood and, under the Labor Commission 
Rules, Employer was responsible for collecting and obtaining all of the medical records and 
creating and filing the Medical Records Exhibit. Further, with regard to the argument that 
Employee had failed to provide the Medical Records of Dr. Hood two weeks in advance of 
the hearing, the ALJ noted that Employer had also failed to timely submit the Medical 
Records Exhibit to the Employee and Employer could have timely obtained Dr. Hood's 
records. The Court further noted that this case involved different factual issues than the 
Basso case relied upon by Employer because, there, the parties had unilaterally decided to 
65Employee'sSOFNo.2 
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put discovery on hold without the permission of the judge. 
The Rules of the Labor Commission specifically allow the ALJ broad discretion in 
admitting or excluding such late-filed documents. Labor Commission Administrative Rule 
602-2-1 provides: 
"5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered 
to the Division and the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) 
working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not 
be admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or 
for good cause shown." 
The ALJ's determinations of whether there was good cause for admitting the "late-
filed" records of Dr. Hood as well for admitting Employer's "late-filed" Medical Records 
Exhibit, are not subject to being overturned, ""unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or 
wholly without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence."67 
While Employer has cited various reasons why it feels that the ALJ should not have 
allowed that late filing of Dr. Hood's records, the exercise of the ALJ's discretion in 
admitting those records under all of the circumstances involved was not wholly without cause 
and it does not "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." 
Further, despite Employer's protestations to the contrary, there is nothing in the law 
or the Rules which requires an ALJ to place an attorney under oath and subject her to cross 
examination regarding the representations made as an officer of the Court, in order for such 
representations to constitute good cause for admission of such "late filed" records. 
66Employee'sSOFNo. 3 
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POINT II 
NEITHER THE ALJ'S REFUSAL TO LEAVE THE RECORD OPEN AFTER 
THE HEARING FOR THE REASONS REQUESTED BY EMPLOYER'S 
COUNSEL NOR HER REFERRAL TO A MEDICAL PANEL AFTER THE 
RECORD WAS CLOSED CONSTITUTED ABUSES OF DISCRETION 
When the ALJ indicated her intention to admit the report of Dr. Hood, Employer then 
argued that the record should be left open to allow it an opportunity to contact Dr. Hood 
directly with additional information. Employer contended: 
"It seems to me that since I first heard of Dr. Hood's report last week that I should be given 
the opportunity to ask Dr. Hood if, upon a full review of the medical records, if that doesn't 
change his opinion. Because if it changes his opinion, then there's no dispute to even go to 
a medical record. And I think I should have the opportunity to ask Dr. Hood if a full review 
of the medical records changes his opinion, since I only learned of Dr. Hood's involvement 
in this case at all last week."68 
The ALJ again exercised her discretion69 in denying that request. The Labor 
Commission's Administrative Rule 602-2-1 (I) (8) sets forth the rules with regard to closing 
the record at the end of the hearing. It provides: 
"Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor Commission, the 
evidentiary record shall be deemed closed at the conclusion of the hearing, and 
no additional evidence will be accepted without leave of the administrative law 
judge." 
The Commission determined that there was no reasonable basis to extend the closing of the 
record to allow such a further examination into the background of Dr. Hood's medical 
records. As she explained 
68Employee's SOF No. 5 
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"And for the record I'll note that the purpose of the medical panel before the 
Utah Labor Commission is to resolve just such disputes as are being presented 
before me today with Dr. Hood's report versus the independent medical 
evaluator. And that is the purpose of the medical panels, so they can evaluate 
all the evidence and make a determination to assist me in rendering a 
decision."70 
While Employer contends that the ALJ erred in not leaving the record open so that 
they could contact Dr. Hood to determine whether he had considered all prior records of the 
Employee before making his report, this again was a matter for the ALJ's discretion.71 
Further, it is important to note that Utah's courts have previously reached the same 
conclusion as that upon which the ALJ based her denial of Employer's Motion to leave the 
evidentiary record open at the close of the hearing. Utah's Supreme Court in Willardson v. 
Industrial Comm 'n,12 reviewed a decision in which the Commission had failed to convene 
a medical panel to evaluate the impairment of the petitioner. The ALJ in that case reviewed 
the medical records and determined there were no "conflicting" medical reports because the 
Employee's two "Summary of Medical Record" forms lacked credibility. They did not 
provide any analysis or background as to how the ratings were reached and did not reflect 
access to all of the Employee's prior medical history and records. Based upon that credibility 
determination, no medical panel was appointed. The Supreme Court, however, explained 
that is not how the need for medical panels was to be determined. Rather, the Court 
10Supra., Note 68 
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explained, whether or not doctors providing medical reports lack access to prior medical 
records or may lack credibility for other reasons is not something to be determined initially 
by the ALJ. Rather, that is something to be submitted to a medical panel for their input and 
opinion.. The Court then reversed and remanded the case for further determination by the 
Commission in accordance with its decision. The Court explained: 
"We have heretofore recognized, independent of any rule of the Commission, 
that 'where the evidence of a causal connection between the work-related 
event and the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the case to 
a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion.'" (Citing cases). 
This Court has further clarified that, only in the unique situation where a physician 
actually fails to offer a "medical" opinion may the ALJ ignore a report as a "conflicting" 
medical opinion and refuse to submit the matter to a Medical Panel.73 
As the ALJ properly determined in this case, given the Commission process regarding 
such matters and the provisions regarding submission of medical issues to Medical Panels 
for their input, there was no reasonable basis demonstrated as to why she should keep the 
record open following the hearing to allow Employer to try to provide additional information 
to Dr. Hood.74 
Further, allowing such actions by Employers (or Employees for that matter) would be 
inconsistent with the workers compensation process as it has been established under Utah 
statutes and Rules. The Commission's processes do not contemplate depositions or 
73Kahler Corp. v. Husereau, 2003 UT App. 239 (July 10, 2003) 
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confrontation of either treating physicians or Employer's hired medical examiners. Neither 
are the parties permitted to call such physicians as witnesses or to cross-examine them as to 
their reports or medical records, or the bases upon which their determinations have been 
made. In adopting those procedures, the Commission has recognized that Employers may 
choose to secure their own IME reports from among those who may be biased by their 
ongoing relationships with, or payments from, the Employers or their insurers and who may 
base their opinions only upon those portions of the record or documents which Employers 
may choose to provide them. In order to counter any potential problems or unfairness arising 
from those limitations, the Workers Compensation Act and the Commission Rules 
specifically provide for the appointment of a separate medical panel to consider the medical 
aspects of a case if the employer denies liability.75 The Commission has also adopted 
guidelines as to when an ALJ must appoint such medical panels under its Administrative 
Rule 602-2-2. That Rule provides, in pertinent part: 
"A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or 
more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports."76 
At the time the evidence was closed and the matter was referred to the Medical Panel, 
there were clearly "conflicting" medical reports. The Commission further determined that 
Dr. Hood's subsequent letter/report constituted a "conflicting" report to his original medical 
report and, therefore, there was, in fact, a conflicting report which required referral of the 
75§34A-2-601 (1), Utah Code Anno. (2002) 
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matter to a medical panel. Whether a panel was needed at that time must be determined 
based upon the evidence in the record at that time, not by records which Employer may 
obtain and submit following the close of the record and referral to a Medical Panel. The 
Commission determined in its original Order of Remand77 that the Medical Panel Report was 
admissible and Employer did not appeal that decision. In that previous decision, the 
Commission explained that the parties are obligated to present their evidence at the time of 
the hearing and: 
"Based on the evidence that was, in fact, presented, Judge Hann properly 
appointed a panel to evaluate the medical aspects of Ms. Jones claim. The 
panel proceeded to perform its independent evaluation and to issue a report 
addressing the relevant medical questions." 
In this case the Commission determined that the provisions of that Rule did not 
preclude the appointment of the first Medical Panel by the ALJ nor the admission of the 
initial Medical Panel Report. It similarly determined that the ALJ's submission of the matter 
for a supplemental Medical Panel Report, in light of the status of the case at that time, was 
proper. As previously reflected, such determinations are factual determinations subject to 
being overturned only where they are wholly without basis and the determinations exceed the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
Finally, although this involves an issue which was not addressed by the ALJ in 
rejecting Employer's request to keep the record open after the hearing to allow Employer to 
confront Dr. Hood with its IME, videos, and other employer-biased materials, it should also 
be noted that, Employer had indicated its intent to conduct that confrontation with 
77R. 178-182 
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Employee's treating physician outside the Subpoena or discovery process and outside the 
knowledge or presence of Employee or her counsel, just as Employer had previously done 
with Dr. Braun. Employer did, in fact, subsequently proceed in that same manner, despite 
the ALJ's refusal to keep the record open following the hearing, in presenting its videos, IME 
reports, and other materials to the treating physician without providing any record or 
testimony of Employee concerning the circumstances surrounding her actions as reflected 
in the video and to which she testified at the hearing. Employee had no means of 
determining what her treating physician was told regarding those matters by Employer due 
to the fact that neither she nor her counsel were provided with any notice or even an 
opportunity to be present during Employer's direct contact with Dr. Hood. Such direct 
contact was in direct violation of Employee's rights of privacy with her treating physician, 
contrary to the Utah Courts' prohibitions as set forth in Barbuton and Goates.19 
POINT III 
ANY ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO LEAVE THE 
RECORD OPEN FOR ADDITIONAL INPUT FROM DR. HOOD 
WOULD BE HARMLESS IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSEQUENT RE-
OPENING OF THE RECORD TO ADMIT DR. HOOD'S 
SUBSEQUENT LETTER/REPORT TO EMPLOYER'S COUNSEL 
Even if had initially been error for the ALJ to refuse to keep the record open to allow 
Employer to determine if Dr. Hood had considered all of the documents Employer wished him 
to consider, any such error was rendered harmless by the fact that the ALJ subsequently re-
78%?ra.,Note42 
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opened the record and allowed the subsequent letter/report of Dr. Hood dated January 30, 
2004, and addressed to Employer, to be admitted into evidence and to be considered by the 
Medical Panel for such weight as they wished to give to it in their Supplemental Report. 
Since the Commission had previously found that subsequent letter/report by Dr. Hood to be 
a "conflicting medical report80" to be considered along with Dr. Hood's initial records, and 
the existing Medical Panel Report, the resulting effect was no different than if the ALJ had 
initially left the record open for Employer to confront Dr. Hood for purposes of securing such 
a subsequent report as requested by Employer. 
POINT IV 
THE ALJ'S SUBMISSION OF THE MATTER FOR A SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
After re-opening the record to allow the admission of the subsequent Letter/Report 
forwarded by Dr. Hood to Employer's counsel on January 30,2004, the ALJ determined that 
it would be appropriate to submit the matter for a Supplemental Medical Panel Report because 
of the significant medical issues being considered. Employer erroneously asserts that 
constituted error on her part. 
As previously indicated, the Commission has adopted its own rules regarding the 
manner in which hearings on objections to Medical Panel Reports are to be handled. The 
Labor Commission's Administrative Rule 602-2-2 provides, in pertinent part: 
"B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is 
a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the 
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medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting 
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-
submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification."81 
When Employer filed its Objections to the Medical Panel Report of August 16, 2004, 
with the proffer of "new written conflicting medical evidence," that Rule directed that the 
ALJ may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and 
clarification. That was precisely what the ALJ did upon remand. Her actions in that regard 
were in accordance with the instructions of the Commission on remand. In its supplemental 
Medical Panel Report of March 24, 2006, the Medical Panel did not consider Dr. Hood's 
subsequent opinion to be sufficient to override their own determinations regarding the 
significant medical issues in this case. Rather, the Medical Panel chose to view the videos in 
the context as testified to by Employee on the record and to determine that, when viewed in 
light of all the facts, they were not inconsistent with her claims. 
The supplemental Medical Panel Report dated March 24, 2006, reaffirmed the 
Medical Panel's previous opinion that Employee was still medically unstable and that surgery 
was reasonable and necessary. It declared, in part, that radiology reports reflected injuries to 
the back and, "These are all considered significant clinical findings and would be considered 
the source of ongoing spinal pain." It further reflected that prior reports suggesting "caution" 
as to any surgical decision were based upon a mis-impression of "minimal objective 
pathology," when, in fact, the radiologic records indicate "significant injury." It further noted: 
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"It appears as I read through the record that many people are paying a great 
deal of attention to the surveillance tapes, but I would like to call attention to 
the report of the medical panel of 16 August, 2004, p. 6, in which the review 
of the video was carried out. It appears that as panel members then we felt that 
she was impaired; in fact, the report even makes the point that the technician 
who set up the video for us involuntarily expressed his opinion that she was 
quite limited in her function in the later sequences of the video, compared to 
those at first, suggesting to us that this is limiting her activities appreciably, 
much more than one gets the impression from reading reports of other 
physicians." 
Finally, the Report concluded: 
"Therefore, it is my opinion that surgery is reasonable and necessary as a result 
of the industrial accident that Ms. Jones sustained. The caveat that I would 
have in recommending this is that 1) she be placed on an upper extremity 
condition program; 2) she be given a time date so that she can wean herself 
from the use of the narcotics; and 3) she be assured that she will not be taken 
to surgery or have surgery scheduled and have it cancelled, which has 
happened twice in the past, but that she can be assured that her treatment will 
continue. Of great concern, of course, would be her weight, her body mass 
index is quite high, and considering the fact that her mother is built very much 
the same as she is, I feel the operating surgeon will have to set goals of 
reasonable weight loss of a few pounds and conditioning. 
The work-up for this case has been so prolonged that one would want to have 
current imaging studies done, and this may even include a provocative 
discogram to find out if the disc above her spondylolisthesis is symptomatic. 
I feel that she is a candidate for surgical correction of her two known 
pathologic entities, and I suggest this be done by a full-time surgeon with a 
comprehensive program for rehabilitation."82 
The ALJ made her subsequent Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order based 
upon the entire record as reflected in her Order of July 18,2006.83 In that Order, she set forth 
a detailed analysis and discussion regarding the injuries suffered by Employee, the analysis 
82R. 190 
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reflecting why she did not appear to have reached medical stability and the insight as to why 
an operation for surgical correction of her injuries was reasonable, including a discussion of 
the analyses and conclusions of the medical records including, but not limited to, the initial 
Medical Panel Report and the subsequent Medical Panel Report, dated March 24, 2006.84 
Based upon those detailed findings and determinations, the ALJ then rendered her Order 
finding that Employee had not reached medical stability, required surgical procedures for 
correction of her injuries, and was entitled to additional disability benefits. Such a finding is 
again subject to the same broad discretionary powers as previously discussed in Point I. 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE ALJ 
FOR ANOTHER HEARING TO DETERMINE EMPLOYEE'S 
CURRENT MEDICAL STATUS WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Following the ALPS Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of July 18, 
200685, in which Employee was determined to be entitled to additional surgical care and 
additional disability benefits, and the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's decision dated 
April 28, 2009, Employer filed a Motion entitled "Motion for Reconsideration and Request 
for Remand Hearing."86 In that Motion, for the first time, Employer submitted an additional 
IME from Dr. Warren Stadler, dated October 17, 2008. 
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The Commission did not abuse its discretion87 in subsequently refusing to remand the 
case to the ALJ to hold a further hearing to determine Employee's current medical status 
based upon the new IME from Dr. Stadler dated October 17, 2008. As indicated above, that 
IME was submitted to the Commission for the first time on May 19, 2009, long after the 
record had been re-opened and re-closed by the ALJ. It was within the Commissions' power 
and discretion, in accordance with the provisions of Labor Commission Administrative Rule 
No. 602-2-1 (I) (8), to re-open a case and accept additional evidence. That provision states: 
"Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor Commission, the evidentiary 
record shall be deemed closed at the conclusion of the hearing, and no additional 
evidence will be accepted without leave of the administrative law judge." 
Such powers are in keeping with the basic underlying "continuing jurisdiction" of the 
Labor Commission with regard to worker's compensation matters. However, that continuing 
jurisdiction is not unlimited and there is a justified need for finality in administrative 
proceedings. As this Court has previously explained: 
"After the Commission has obtained initial jurisdiction, The Commission may 
not arbitrarily exercise continuing jurisdiction to modify an award. See 
Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n. 733 P. 2d 158,161 (Utah, 1987). The basis for 
reopening a claim is provided by 'evidence of some significant change or new 
development in claimant's injury or proof of the previous award's 
inadequacy.'/d."88 
Further, the Commission cannot redetermine a case on identical facts because a party is 
dissatisfied with the former Order.89 
87See prior discussion in Point I 
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In the present case, the Commission found that is what Employer was impermissibly 
attempting to do with its Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Remand Hearing. In 
its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission explained that it noted the 
attempt by Employer to introduce a new medical opinion to refute the prior Medical Panel's 
opinions as to causation and recommendation for surgery and to secure a new evidentiary 
hearing as to whether surgery was required, in light of the period of time which had transpired 
since the Medical Panel Reports. However, the Commission denied Employer's Motion, 
declaring: 
"The issues of medical causation, medical stability and recommended medical 
care have been adjudicated in this matter. Nevertheless, Resort Retailers 
provides a recent medical opinion from its medical consultant that reaches an 
opinion contrary to the medical panel. A review of this new opinion also 
shows that the medical consultant based his opinion on the medical evidence 
that the medical panel already had reviewed. The Appeals Board declines to 
reopen the evidentiary record to include Resort Retailers' recent medical 
opinion on issues already decided."90 
This, again, was an exercise of the Commission's broad discretionary powers as 
discussed previously in Point I. Under the totality of the facts reflected in this case, those 
decisions were once again not wholly without basis and the Commission's determinations did 
not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the Commission's Order and award along with the 
determination that the Employee, Ms. Jones, has not reached MMI, is entitled to the additional 
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disability benefits as Ordered, and that the surgery sought for treatment of her work-related 
injury was reasonable and necessary. While Employer may disagree with the actions of the 
ALJ and the Commission, as referenced in Employer's Brief, those determinations were made 
within the broad discretionary powers of the Commission. Employee submits that the facts 
and circumstances reflected in the record, when taken as a whole, fail to establish that those 
determinations were "arbitrary or capricious," "wholly without cause," "contrary to the one 
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence," or that they were outside the bounds of 
"reasonableness and rationality." The Utah Courts have declared that they will not overturn 
decisions under such circumstances. This Court should, therefore, affirm the Commission's 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration dated July 21,2009, as well as the Commission's 
underlying Order Affirming ALJ's Decision dated April 28, 2009. 
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